axiomatic, were challenged in a manner and on a scale that was unprecedented. But the new order of institutions and ideas required a theoretical interpretation and defense -- in part to make the altered world intelligible to those who were active in bringing it to birth, in part to serve as a weapon against those who stood in the way of further alterations. It was the historical mission of sensationalistic empiricism -- the "philosophy of experience," as Mill called it -- to perform just this function. It was this philos- ophy which had been used to consolidate the victories won in the bloodless revolution of 1688, which formed a major prop for the French Enlightenment and its sequel, and which in the nineteenth century helped the industrial class coming into power to undermine the system of ideas associated with a feudal economy and to justify its scheme of social policy. The philosophical school with which Mill was connected regarded its doctrines as the explicit formulation of a conception of things demanded by modern science, and its members identified them- selves with the "party of Progress" that was struggling to bring about basic political and social changes. But conversely, defenders of the passing order of ideas, in addition to employing other means, attempted to stem the tide of events by directing their fire on the weaknesses and inadequacies of the "negative" philosophy of their opponents, and by recasting the theoretical foundations of their own ancient faiths. The French Revolution and its consequences produced a powerful reaction throughout Europe against the ideas associated with the Enlightenment -- a reaction that was nour- ished by the social groups in the process of being displaced from their traditional positions of dominance, but also by the wide- spread social evils that accompanied the maturing of the industrial revolution. An important fraction of nineteenth century philo- sophic writing was devoted, on the one hand, to a vigorous criticism of the philosophy of experience, and on the other hand to a reinter- pretation of age-old beliefs and institutions so as to win for them a secure place in the new order of things. Adherents of the philosophy of experience were thus faced with a double task: the continuation of their assault on what they believed were unworthy survivals from older social and intellectual systems; and the reformulation of their own principles with a view -xvi- |