in space, then there would be only a causal explanation;
but we have also to deal conceptually with movement
relations, which demand an energic point of view. ¹ If this
were not so, there would have been no need to invent a theory
of energy. The predominance of the one or of the other
standpoint depends less upon the objective behaviour of
things than upon the psychological attitude of the investigator.
The tendency to feel oneself into objects (Einfühlung) leads
to a mechanistic view, while the tendency to abstract oneself
from objects (Abstraction) leads to the energic view. Both
tendencies are liable to the error in thought of hypostasizing
their principles because of the so-called objective facts of
experience. They make the mistake of assuming that the
subjective concept is identical with the behaviour of things,
that, for example, causality as we experience it in ourselves
is also to be found objectively in this behaviour. This error
is a very common one and leads to incessant conflicts with
the opposite principle; for, as was said, it is impossible to
think of the decisive factor being causal and final both at
the same time. But this insupportable contradiction comes
about only through the illegitimate and thoughtless pro-
jection into the object itself of what is a mere way of looking
at things. Our ways of looking at things can only be kept
free from contradictions when it is realized that they belong
to the psychological sphere, and are only hypothetically
projected into the objective behaviour of things. The
principle of causality bears without contradiction its logical
reverse, but the facts do not; hence causality and finality
must preclude each other in the object. After the well-

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