The mere thought of civil strife sent shivers of fear down the spine of
landed Titans. In a speech to the House of Lords in December 1642, the
earl of Pembroke voiced the unthinkable: 'we hear every base fellow say in
the street as we pass by in our coaches, that they hope to see us a foot
shortly and to be as good men as the Lords; and I think they will be as good
as their words, if we take this course'. ⁵ Sir Thomas Salusbury of Lleweni,
fearful of a 'perpetual war', warned of the example of Holland, which had
been 'the stage of war' and 'the cockpit of all Christendom' ever since its
subjects had challenged the authority of its sovereign. ⁶ Brooding long over
the indescribable horrors which had befallen Germany and central Europe
during the Thirty Years' War, men were convinced that untold misery
would engulf the kingdom in the form of famine, pestilence, fire, and
economic dislocation. Not surprisingly, in view of the likely economic
consequences of civil strife, landed proprietors fervently hoped that a
single major battle would bring men to their senses and the war to a speedy
conclusion.

The line-up at the outbreak of hostilities was neither clear cut nor tidy.
On balance, however, the more populous and economically advanced
areas of England and Wales, including London and many ports, were for
Parliament, whilst the more sparsely populated and underdeveloped areas
of the north and west of England, and Wales, supported the Crown. From
the outset it was vitally important for the king to control the borderlands,
for Wales could not only provide him with wealth, victuals, and armies, but
might also afford an avenue to Ireland should foreign relief be required.
Conversely, Parliament was determined to drive a wedge through the
royalist barricade on the Welsh Marches. Sea power, too, was a crucial
strategic factor. No waterway was more important to both parties than the
Irish Sea. Royalist authority over north Wales would depend heavily on
the ability of the king's vessels to maintain control of the seas, whilst
parliamentary ships would be obliged to patrol the Irish Sea in order to
repel potential invaders from Ireland and capture strategic landing-places
like Milford Haven and the Menai Straits.

In spite of his many personal defects, Charles I was able to induce awe
and evoke respect among Welshmen simply by virtue of his kingship. Ever
since Henry Tudor's dazzling victory at Bosworth Field in 1485, the Welsh
had nursed a warm affection and respect for the Crown. This fondness had
persisted throughout the Tudor age and had been transferred, virtually
undiluted, to the Stuarts. Those well-versed in politics were not, of course,
so ingenuous as to see Charles as a paragon of virtue, but his call to arms
nevertheless struck a deep responsive chord in their hearts. Welsh
gentlemen, in particular, were deeply conscious of the extent to which their

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