to himself and even succeeded in forgetting it. The 'good'
philosophy was based on logic, the 'vulgar' version was
metaphysical. I hope to show that this separation of logic
from metaphysics would not be thought at all desirable by
Leibniz, and that he himself gave a true account of the
differences in his manner of presentation in a letter to
Arnauld. In this letter, he says that he thought a philoso-
pher would appreciate arguments drawn from the logical
nature of propositions, but that not many lay people
would be able to follow them. He speaks consistently of
logic and metaphysics as supporting one another and
would certainly not have been willing to give an account
of human expressions without considering whether these
forms of expression were adequate to say all that must be
said about the world. This can be settled only by meta-
physical enquiry. In fairness to Leibniz, we must add that
the same obnoxious conclusions which Arnauld drew
from the logical account of Leibniz's philosophy, the Dis-
course on Metaphysics, follow equally from the metaphysical
treatise, the Monadology, which he wrote under the en-
couragement of his patron's daughter, Queen Sophia of
Prussia.

We must also remember that Leibniz believed very
strongly that it was essential that knowledge and correct
ways of thinking should be as widely spread as possible.
We need not look for motives of self-interest and timidity
when such a thinker tries to make his work intelligible to
anyone who shows interest in it, even when these people
happen to be his patrons, or rather, especially not when
these people happen to be his patrons. Leibniz genuinely
believed that his work was of great practical importance,
and that it was his duty to arouse and satisfy the interest of
those who not only needed and desired enlightenment
themselves, but would be powerful instruments in the
spreading of enlightenment. Leibniz dreamed of centres

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