Scientific Empiricism says: ' Leibniz's plan for a universal
mathematics, a calculus of reasoning, a general character-
istic, and a unified science expressed in the form of an
encyclopaedia, all remain valid when interpreted as logical
rather than as metaphysical doctrines. Leibniz's rational-
istic metaphysics, which came from the simple conversion
of formal logic into a metaphysics through the neglect of
the criterion of the empirically meaningful, is, in terms of
the present conception of the relation of logic to empiri-
cism, no longer the necessary cosmological corollary of
his logical doctrines.'

Leibniz is thus in the peculiar position of being one of
the most 'metaphysical' of writers and yet of being taken
as 'one of us' by the moderns. This largely arises from his
work on logic, and also from the fact, as Morris points
out, that his system lends itself very completely to a trans-
lation from metaphysical into logical terms; in fact, he
himself partly provides this translation in a double deduc-
tion of his more important positions: a series of state-
ments setting out the nature of propositions and their
analysis, and a metaphysical demonstration that the ele-
ments of things, and the relations between things, are
such that everything that needs to be said about the world
can be said by means of propositions so described and
analysed. This is shown in detail in a later chapter. It is
enough to say here that an interpretation of the system of
Leibniz as a purely logical one would not have satisfied
Leibniz himself. He says: Nemo autem vereri ne characterum
contemplatio nos a rebus abducat, imo contra ad intima rerum
ducet... (Moreover, let no one be afraid that the contem-
plation of signs will lead us away from things. On the con-
trary, it will guide us to the innermost nature of things.)
Again he says: 'Truths do not depend upon names and are
not arbitrary as some of our new philosophers think.' ¹

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