ness? Do they not represent the very dregs of
stale apologetics; the outworn residue of half-for-
gotten controversies?

For my own part, I do not think the argument
from contrivance bad, but I do think it very lim-
ited: limited in respect of its premises; limited
also in respect of its conclusions. It may, per-
haps, be worth dwelling on some of these limita-
tions, if only to make my own position clearer by
contrast.

In the first place, it must be noted that, from
a consideration of inanimate nature alone it is
difficult, perhaps impossible, to infer design. The
mere existence of natural laws is not, as it seems to
me, a sufficient basis for the argument; we require
also that these laws should combine to subserve an
end. Were the universe, for example, like a huge
impervious reservoir of some simple gas, where
nothing rested but nothing changed, where amid
all the hurry and bustle of colliding atoms no
new thing was ever born, nor any old thing ever
perished, we might find in it admirable illustra-
tions of natural law, but no hints, so far as I can
see, of purpose or design. Nor is the case really
mended if, instead of thus artificially simplifying
inanimate nature, we consider it in all its concrete
complexity. Even cosmic evolution of the Spen-
cerian type will scarcely help us. Herbert Spen-

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