possible, as we shall see more fully in later chapters, that the sensuous material of perception and imagination and memory is qualitatively one and the same. Visual mental stuff, for example, whether perceptually or ideationally produced, is sui generis, and totally unlike any other kind of mental stuff, such as auditory or olfactory. It will be seen that the radical distinction above mentioned between the perceptual consciousness of objects and such con- sciousness of them as we may have in memory and imagina- tion rests upon a physiological basis, i. e., the presence or absence of sense organ activity. The only difference on the mental side is commonly to be found in the intensity and objectivity of the two. Perceptions are ordinarily more intense, and feel more as though given to us, than do our memories or imaginings. Nevertheless, there are many per- sons whose imagery frequently takes on an almost perceptual vividness and is followed by motor consequences such as nor- mally belong to sense stimuli. The thought of blood, for example, or the description of a wound will in these cases elicit the most life-like visual images followed by nausea and even vomiting. In hallucination, too, it seems as though mere mental images assumed the vividness and externality of per- cepts; and in the case of very faint stimulations, e. g., of sound or colour, we cannot always be confident whether we have really perceived something, or merely imagined it. This principle of distinguishing the two is, therefore, not always to be depended upon. Fortunately for our practical interests, the distinction is generally valid and we do not often confuse what we really perceive, with what we imagine. It must be said that certain distinguished psychologisits maintain that there is a real difference in quality between perceptual and ideational material. They base their view partly upon introspective grounds and partly upon alleged evi- dence from cases of mental disease, where the power to obtain images is lost without entire loss of perceptual capacity. To -152- |