procedure of most of us is after this order. VVe think of one
route as being pictursque, and wholly novel, but also as being
expensive. We think of another as less interesting, but also
as less expensive. A third is, we discover, the most expedi-
tions, but also the most costly of the three. We find ourselves
confronted, then, with the necessity of choosing with regard
to the relative merits of cheapness, beauty, and speed. We
proceed to consider these points in the light of all our inter-
ests, and the decision more or less makes itself. We find, for
instance, that we must, under the circumstances, select the
cheapest route.

Now, this process is evidently made up of a number of
judments, in which we have employed various conceptions of
the routes and the consequences connected with their choice.
Obviously, also, we have made constant use of the machinery
of association, by means of which the various connected ideas
have called one another into the mind. Our conclusion is
seemingly the, outcome of a series of judgments, whose num-
ber may be wholly indeterminate, and whose order is far from
systematic. Nevertheless, the process results in a solution of
the problem, the conclusion is essentially a reasoned one, and
the operation is alltogether typical of the fashion in which
we actually deal with the practical problems of common ex-
perience.

When we look at tile successive steps a little more closely,
we see that such judgments bring into the foreground some
aspect of the general problem which assists us in viewing
the situation in its entirety. Thus, the idea of cost as less
by one route than by the others proved in our final estimate
to be of fundamental significance. But we could not isolate
this element of the problem and conceive it aright until we
had compared routes with one another, and considered all
the expenses involved in each. Only then were we in a posi-
tion to assert which route was cheapest. This crucial judg-
ment issued immediately from our comparison of the several

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