the solution is not a single imputation but rather a system of imputations. 1.2. The proposed oligopoly solution 1.2.1. Although the concept of solution that is used in the oligopoly solution proposed in Chapters IV through VI is akin to game theory, the methods used in deriving the solution are different. Thus far the development in the Theory of Games has been centered in the solution of zero-sum games (where the losses of some persons in the game are equivalent to the gains of the remaining persons) and the min-max games (where with two players, though both want to maximize their gains, because it is a zero-sum game one player must have negative gains so that instead of maximizing his gains he is minimizing his losses). 3 In economics, other situations are encountered, namely, non-zero- sum and max-max games. In Sec. 13.3.5, Stackelberg's solution is expressed as a max-max game solution. A more satisfactory solution for non-zero-sum games and max-max type solutions is still needed. 4 1.2.2. We use the indifference curves technique in the case of two sellers and the results are extended to the case of n sellers. The proofs that are given are far from rigorous but, in presenting these problems, it is hoped that the attention of mathematicians will be attracted to some of the peculiar problems of economics and that as a result new mathematical techniques will be de- veloped to cope with the special problems. 1.2.3. In the proposed oligopoly solution, rather than giving definite sets of profits or prices for the sellers, we shall be con- cerned with directions only, that is, with whether the sellers will decide to increase or decrease their prices. It is to be noted here that although theories of competition or monopoly give definite points of solutions in mathematical or graphic form, in actual practice definite prices and profits cannot be determined with this procedure because demand curves, supply curves, ____________________ | 3 | See J. McKinsey, Introduction to the Theory of Games ( New York: McGraw- Hill, 1952), pp. 358-359. | | 4 | See R. Dorfman, P. A. Samuelson and R. M. Solow, Linear Programming and Economic Analysis ( New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), pp. 444-445. | -4- |