general restoration of properties and privileges was a part of his
demand, to be enforced by the sword. Carbo and the Senate no
longer pulled together. That the importance of the new citizens
was recognized, is clear from an obscure record of an attempt
to please them by some concession at this juncture. This was
probably a countermove to the reassuring message of Sulla,
referred to above. Whatever it may have effected, in the way
of attaching the discontented to the Marian cause, was neutralized
by the blundering of the Marian leaders. The consuls elected
for 83, L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus and C. Junius Norbanus,
were active men, but unequal to the crisis. Carbo went to the
Cisalpine as proconsul, to raise another army. Sertorius, the one
good officer they had, was kept in the background. In short, for
want of a strong directing head, they were putting their trust in
numbers. Far-sighted men began to detect signs of their coming
failure. Such was Carbo's quaestor C. Verres. He robbed the
military chest and went off to Sulla.

427. The government could not rely on the unanimous
support of Italy. For instance, the long-Romanized district of
Picenum needed watching. Sulla was free from such anxieties,
and was undoubted master in his own camp. At Brundisium he
was joined by Metellus with a force from Africa. Stray refugees
rallied to him as the news of his return spread. Among his
partisans was M. Licinius Crassus, who had been through many
adventures. Most cheering was the arrival of young Cn. Pompeius
with three legions raised in Picenum. And all accessions to his
numbers meant genuine accessions of strength. With able and
loyal lieutenants and soldiers devoted to his cause, he pushed on
boldly. He defeated Norbanus in Apulia, met Scipio in northern
Campania, and by sham negotiations gained time to corrupt his
half-hearted troops. The consul's army went over to him in a
body. Sertorius, disgusted with these failures, went away to his
province in Spain. So far Sulla had done well. But the Marian
forces in the field were still far more numerous than his own.
The fear that he would, if victorious, annul the privileges of the
new citizens had enabled Carbo to raise immense armies in the
North. Therefore he employed the winter of 83-82 in negotiating
with various new-citizen communities, probably the Marsi and
other peoples of that group. It is said that he concluded with
them a regular treaty, pledging himself not to disturb them in

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