(1) In the first place we have immediate judgments of sense
perception, judgments whereby we interpret individual facts of
internal or external sense experience, as "I am writing," "it is
raining," "this is a shilling," "that is the sound of the night mail
passing". Such judgments are all singular and contingent; they
assert the real existence or happening of some individual con-
tingent thing or event; or characterize it in some way. Hence
we may also call them judgments of identification, designation,
classification,--whereby we recognize certain attributes as char-
acterizing individual things or events and designate these ac-
cordingly. They are synthetic judgments, i.e. the information
given by such judgments is derived not from any analysis of
our concept of their respective subjects, but from experience.
In fact the only concept we have of the subject, as such, is
the concept of "this being, thing, or event": "hoc aliquid";
τοδὲ τί.

They give rise to the broad critical question of the trustworthiness, or the
proper interpretation, of the data of sense experience; and also to the ques-
tion: What relation does the content of our universal concepts bear to the
data of our sense experience?

(2) Secondly, we have immediate judgments derived from ana-
lysis and comparison of abstract ideas, as "the whole is greater
than its part," "two and two are four," "a judgment cannot be
both true and false," "injustice is wrong," "virtue is praiseworthy".
Like those of the previous class, such judgments also appear to
be immediately evident, but unlike the former they seem to be
necessarily and therefore also universally true: they are analytic,
for the relation between predicate and subject is seen, by analysis
of these latter, to arise necessarily from a comparison of them.
They are called axioms or first principles. The existence of such
a class of judgment is undisputed, though there has been much
controversy as to whether such or such a judgment,--eg. "What-
ever happens has a cause"; "the course of Nature is uniform,"--
belongs to this class. Likewise their necessary character, their
power of compelling our intellectual assent, is undisputed, though
the nature and origin of this necessity are variously explained.
Moreover, the significance of such judgments, or in other words
the question: What insight, if any, do such abstract, necessary,
and universal judgments give us into reality?--will also have to be
examined.

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