The central premise of this book is that, in light of the diffuse benefits and
concentrated costs of environmental protection, governments generally
will be unwilling to pursue policies to protect the environment, although
their reluctance may be briefly overcome during periods of exceptional
public attentiveness to environmental issues. This premise has several
implications for the relationship between federalism and environmental
protection. First, it is argued here that both federal and provincial govern-
ments tend to value their environmental jurisdiction during periods of
heightened salience of environmental issues. The rest of the time the fed-
eral government is ill-inclined to exercise its jurisdiction and takes
advantage of jurisdictional uncertainty by 'passing the buck' to jurisdic-
tionally defensive provinces. Second, it is anticipated that provincial
government's responsiveness to the concentrated interests of industry
could lead them to compete for investment by lowering, or at least declin-
ing to strengthen, their environmental standards. Given the federal
government's anticipated reluctance in the environmental field, the emer-
gence of national standards to preclude this dynamic is by no means
guaranteed. Third, it is argued that federal-provincial relations generally
will be cooperative in light of the compatibility of provincial defensive-
ness concerning natural resources and the federal government's
inclination to cede environmental responsibility to the provinces.
However, intergovernmental competition and conflict could emerge dur-
ing brief periods of heightened salience of environmental issues when
both levels of government would be expected to adopt a broader view of
their jurisdiction.

The material presented in Chapters 3 through 6 reviews the evolution of
the federal government's role in environmental protection and of federal-
provincial relations through two complete cycles of public opinion. This
chapter considers the degree to which the evidence supports the theoreti-

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