judgment that follows from it. If, then, we
would avoid a groundless judgment we must be
able to connect our judgment with something that
goes beyond it, and this work of interconnexion
is the main positive function of reason. Thirdly,
it is held irrational to base a judgment on emotion
or desire, or, indeed, on any "subjective" atti-
tude, any impulse that proceeds merely from our-
selves. But this condemnation must be subject to
two qualifications. In the first place the judgment
may be about the emotions, or may be simply an
expression of the emotions, e.g. "This is revolt-
ing," "that is enchanting." For judgments of
this class the emotion itself is the only appropriate
ground. Secondly, every judgment of mine as it
issues from me must in a manner be held to ema-
nate from my subjectivity, to be an expression of
my thought working in accordance with the meth-
ods and processes of my mental constitution. It
seems, then, that we cannot mean to condemn the
subjective altogether. What we must mean is to
condemn it in so far as it diverts us from the ob-
jective, and this means something that is, whether
you or I happen to think so, or say so, or not.
The rational, then, is that which deals with the
objective order. But the objective is not unfor-
tunately so plainly hall-marked that we distinguish

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