the most favorable opportunity was lost. Remittances from Germany did not arrive until long afterwards, and then only to a very modest extent. Consequently the whole economic scheme was considerably narrowed and hampered from the beginning. The second assumption, that the United States, in con- sideration of her great commercial connections with Ger- many, would maintain her rights as a neutral State to unrestricted sea trade within the provisions of interna- tional law, proved to be unfounded. The United States, at any rate according to the view of some very distin- guished Americans, as, for example, in the journal New Republic, violated the spirit of neutrality when she al- lowed commerce of the neutrals one with another to be strangled by England. To the interest in traffic with the neutral States, and indirectly with Germany, was opposed the interest in the still greater trade with our enemies, to which was added, and indeed to a rapidly increasing extent, the supply of war material. The United States did not realize the extent of their economic power in respect of England, as the inexperienced, newly-ap- pointed Democratic Government had no statistics to which to refer, and from a military point of view were defenceless for want of an army or fleet. So England was able, slowly and cautiously, but surely, to cut off the Central Powers from the American market. In view of this state of things the important thing was to pass all shipments off as neutral. The exporter had to be an American or a subject of neutral Europe. The financing had also to be European, at any rate outwardly. The destination could only be a port in Holland, Scandinavia, Spain or--at that time--Italy. Consequently it was not long before the consignments could no longer be made through the New York representative of the Hamburg- Amerika line, but were taken in hand by Herr Albert -81- |