The result of their neglect of the Psychology of the Experience which expresses itself in the Doctrine of Ideas is that the scholars to whom I refer, going to Plato's text in the dark, lose themselves in it. Having no clue they find themselves in a labyrinth. Because Plato, dealing, at different periods of his life, with different subjects, in Dialogues differently staged, phrases and accentuates the Doctrine of Ideas differently, they tell us that he has altered the Doctrine essentially' they ask us to believe that at one period of his career he held this opinion, and at another period that opinion, while Pupils of the Academy, Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians, not to mention Aristotle himself, held certain other opinions--'about the Ideas'. 'But,' we ask, 'What are the Ideas? What were Plato and these other people talking about? Surely about the right way of expressing some Experience which they all had in common, and we ourselves still have. Tell us in the language, vernacular or philosophical, of to-day what that Experience is.' To this appeal the textualists have no response to make; in lieu they either offer us empirical judgements suggested by simple inspection of the language employed in various passages, or else ask us to accept the translation of some term or phrase αὺτὰ καθ αὺτά, χωρίς, παρειυαι, μετέχειυ, μίμησις, παράδειγμα--as a sufficient interpretation of Plato's Doctrine as it happened to stand when he used the term or phrase in question. Translation, in which, naturally, the expositors agree, offered as interpretation, and em- pirical judgements, in which they, as naturally, differ-- these are the chief constituents of expositions which attempt to interpret the literary evidence for the meaning of the Doctrine of Ideas without seeking the control of Psychology. It is to Aristotle's version of the Doctrine of Ideas that these recent expositions ultimately go back--to a version vitiated, like most of Aristotle's versions of Plato's doc- trines, by the Pupil's inability or unwillingness to enter -2- |