into the Psychology of the Experience to which the Master
was giving expression.

The Experience to which Plato gave expression in his
Doctrine of Ideas was a double one--not always, I think,
recognized by himself as double: it was the Experience of
one keenly interested in, and highly capable of taking, the
scientific point of view in all departments of knowledge;
and it was also the Experience of one singularly sensitive
to aesthetic influences. It was the Experience of one who
was a great man of science and connoisseur of scientific
method, and also a great artist.

The Doctrine of Ideas, expressing this double Experience,
has accordingly its two sides, the methodological and the
aesthetic. The former side Aristotle misunderstands, and
to the latter is entirely blind. If the Ideas are 'Separate
Things', as Aristotle maintains, then the Doctrine of Ideas
can have no methodological significance; for methodo-
logy must assume that science works with 'concepts',
which are not themselves 'things' but general points of
view from which things, i.e. sensible things--the only
'separate things' known to science--are regarded. Even
a common-sense estimate of the character and extent of
Plato's contribution to methodology in the Doctrine of Ideas
an estimate made with the aid of the most elementary
psychology of the faculties with which the man of science
goes to work would have brought Aristotle to see that the
Ideas, whether as objects or as instruments of scientific
thought, are not 'separate things'. But he did not take
the trouble to make such an estimate, lie has no eye for
the wide view of scientific method opened up in the Doctrine
of Ideas as set forth in the Sixth Book of the Republic,
in the Phaedo, in the Philebus, and in the Sophistes. One
is tempted to account for this by saying that Aristotle's
eminence as man of science and contributor to the logic
of the sciences lay, after all, in the regions of departmental
research, and that he never rose to the speculative height
which his master occupied as methodologist; but if one

-3-