low that experience itself is complex. This has been
a stumbling-block for modern psychology because
of the frequent lack of clear distinction between
consciousness and its object. It is often said that
the content is not complex, but is simple and uni-
tary; and that the elements into which we apparently
resolve it by analysis are really new content brought
into existence by our analysis. In stricter language,
this really means that while the content which you
apprehend is complex, and may be resolved into its
elements, the apprehension or experience of the
content is not itself a complex made up of the appre-
hensions of the different elements. To this dogma
there is so far no reasonable objection, although it
may be found ultimately that even experience is
not so unitary as it appears to be; or rather, as it
suits our presuppositions to think it is.

In the examination of content of consciousness it
is important to ascertain as definitely as possible
how many sorts of elementary content there are.
By elementary content, or element of content, we
mean that portion of content which is not itself com-
plex; that is, which cannot in turn be analyzed into
component parts. Of such elements there appear

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