tack, was wounded so as to be unable to take further part, Scott himself assumed
the command. At this time about a fourth of the American militia had crossed
and were attacked by slightly superior numbers of British regulars and Indians.
Their remaining companions, utterly undisciplined and with no leaders, were struck
by panic cowardice and refused to cross to the assistance of their fellows. Scott
behaved with distinguished personal bravery, rallying his raw troops and leading
them in a charge with the bayonet, always a favorite weapon with him. Never-
theless his forces soon fell into disorder and were driven over the cliffs to the
edge of the water, where, from lack of boats, most of the men were made prison-
ers, Scott among the number. Much difficulty was experienced by the British
officers in preventing the Indians from massacring the prisoners. Scott was a
man of gigantic proportions. This fact, and the reckless courage with which he
had fought, had attracted the attention of the Indians. Some of them came into
the room where he was confined and attempted to murder him, and only his
great strength and quickness enabled him to beat them off until he was rescued
by a British officer.

Soon after his capture he was exchanged, and promoted to the rank of colo-
nel. He joined the American armies as chief of staff to the major-general com-
manding, and being about the only man in the army who had any knowledge of
tactical manuals and military treatises generally, he was kept busy from morning
till night in organizing the staff service, drilling the officers, and the like. These
duties, however, did not interfere with his leading and commanding his troops in
battle. He led the advance guard in the successful assault on Fort George in
May, 1813, took part in a number of skirmishes, and served with gallantry in
Wilkinson's unsuccessful campaign.

Early in the spring of 1814 a camp of instruction for officers and men was
formed, with Scott in command, near Buffalo. Up to this time the imbecility
of the administration (and of the people whom the administration represented)
in not preparing for the war, had been well matched by the supineness with
which they carried it on. During the eighteen months that had elapsed since
the beginning of the contest, only the navy, built by the Federalists when in
power fifteen years before, had saved the country from complete disgrace, the
armies generally being utterly inadequate in number, and moreover models
of all that troops ought not to be. Even in 1814 this remained true of the
forces intrusted with the defence of the Capital itself; but on the northern fron-
tier Scott, and his immediate superior, Brown, by laborious work succeeded in
turning the inefficient mob of the first two campaigns into as admirable a
weapon of offence and defence as ever was handled by a general officer.

In July the little army of skeleton regiments, thus carefully drilled, was ready
for the invasion of Canada. On July 5th the fight at Chippewa took place.
The battle was practically between Scott's wing of Brown's army and Riall's
British troops, the numbers being almost exactly equal. There was very little
manoeuvring. After a tolerably heavy artillery fire and some skirmishing be-
tween the light troops and Indians on each side, in the woods, the British regu-

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