the era, arms control became the principal conduit for
Soviet-American relations. In the Gorbachev years, particularly
the last ones, it emerged as the deliberate bridgehead on both
sides for an ever increasing and ever more positive dialogue
between these onetime deadly rivals. Even in times of tension,
arms control trudged ever on in some form--although for
differing reasons for each side, as Savel'yev and Detinov
confirm here. Their story reveals the dark truths of the disparate
origins of our national motivations for arms control, but also
how, as we truly began to share a common sense of purpose and
urgency, we became determined to find a workable solution to
our shared burden.

Dr. Savel'yev and General Detinov have opened up to
us the inner workings of the Soviet mind in arms control. This
book is a surprisingly objective, and detailed, account written by
those at the heart of the practical Soviet arms control team. I am
struck by how much and by how little we knew at the time of
those workings. In retrospect, I find we were remarkably well
informed about who was in charge and the essentials of their
decision-making process. But matters such as the Krasnoyarsk
radar tangle--just how the Soviet leadership backed into the
ABM mess without thinking, or almost offhandedly--I find
fascinating and perhaps a little disturbing.

That the arms control talks resulted in a bit of
unintended early glasnost' in Soviet officialdom was no small
matter in itself. I recall firsthand how the military dominated
the domestic discussions on nuclear matters for the Soviets,
and the Ministry of Defense's jealous protection of any and all
information about it. As the authors explain, the Soviet Ministry
of Defense held a domestic monopoly on all information
regarding the Soviet Strategic Forces--specifically including its
nuclear weapons. As we ourselves discovered, the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their government's intermediary
abroad, was woefully ill-informed about the matter they had to
help negotiate. In fact, at the time we seemed better informed
than their Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On one occasion, we
were debating with the Soviets about a particular missile silo
that was located not too far from the Moscow area. As it
happened, the silo fell almost exactly on the border drawn

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