ciples, strategies, and tactics developed on the basis of the cognitive model
of anxiety disorders and phobias.

A central theme of part I is the apparent perversity of systems that have
evolved to protect the individual, yet become directed in such a way as to
work against him. I attempt to show how anxiety symptoms are a manifes-
tation of survival mechanisms directed by cognitive processes. The adap-
tive value of information processing can be observed beginning with rela-
tively simple creatures such as the amoeba and the paramecium, which are
programmed to make rapid decisions in order to adjust to changes in the
milieu. In humans, an analogous process filters out relevant data, makes
decisions, and implements adaptive behavior. It also plays a role in the
generation of anxiety.

Part I asserts that innate or preprogrammed responses are as relevant to
humans as to single-celled organisms. The centrality of preprogrammed
behavior in nonhuman animals has been generally accepted. It may be a
bit more difficult to accept the notion that, to a large degree, humans
function in ways similar to other animals. Few of our psychological pro-
cesses are conscious; most are involuntary. In no area is the operation of
these nonvolitional processes more apparent than in anxiety disorders--
in which, for no apparent reason, one may suddenly become mute, find
one's mind going blank, and become rooted to the spot. In this section, I
will attempt to unravel the mystery of such paradoxical reactions.

Part I takes an open-ended approach to the cause of anxiety. We do not
conceive of cognitive factors as "causing" anxiety disorders. Although
aberrant cognitive processing leads to a variety of unpleasant feelings and
inhibitions, the triggering of this mechanism is produced by a variety of
factors. In the future, the role of heredity, experience, and hormonal fac-
tors in activating these mechanisms will have to be delineated.

The first part of the book tries to explain how an apparatus that was
developed for purposes of survival can produce so much distress. The first
chapter lays the groundwork by defining terms and concepts, particularly
the distinctions between fear and anxiety, realistic and unrealistic fears,
and differences in mobilization for both present and future danger.
Throughout, the adaptational function of anxiety is stressed.

The second chapter looks into the analysis of the symptoms as manifes-
tations of the hyperactivity of certain vital systems. The operation of these
systems is seen as occurring in a variety of patterns that serve different
functions. Only when there is a substantial mismatch between a person's
perception of the environment and its actual characteristics does a psycho-
logical disturbance occur.

The problem of the mismatch is detailed in chapter 3, which focuses on

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