The internal/external is gradually assuming a central position in legal
theory and in socio-legal studies. H. L. A. Hart ( 1961: 55) introduced
this distinction to legal theory when he argued that 'a social rule has an
internal aspect' which distinguishes it from mere habit and must be taken
into account as an essential characteristic of legal rules. The distinction
arose again in a dispute between Hart and Ronald Dworkin over the
propriety of descriptive jurisprudence. Dworkin's 'central objection
seems to be that legal theory must take account of an internal perspec-
tive on the law which is the viewpoint of an insider or participant in a
legal system, and no adequate account of this internal perspective can be
provided by a descriptive theory whose viewpoint is not that of a par-
ticipant but that of an external observer' ( Hart 1994: 242). Law's Empire
( 1986), Dworkin latest elaboration of his theory, is essentially con-
structed upon this very point: 'This book takes up the internal, partici-
pants' point of view' (p. 14 ). Moreover, Dworkin argues that the
internal view 'must be judged internally by its own standards' ( Moore
1989: 953), and cannot be judged by standards external to the practice.

The internal/external distinction has also been invoked as the essen-
tial element which distinguishes the scholarship of Critical Legal
Studies (CLS) from mainstream doctrinal analysis. According to David Trubek
( 1984: 589), 'CLS follows this tradition: Analyzing the law from
the outside, . . .' And the distinction has been identified as the core char-
acteristic which unifies legal sociology, as well as distinguishes it from
traditional legal studies. Legal sociologist Roger Cotterrell ( 1983: 242)
described it thus: '[t]he numerous approaches to legal analysis which
can be characterized as sociological in the broadest sense are unified
only by their deliberate self-distancing from the professional viewpoint
of the lawyer. It is implicit in the aim of empirical legal theory that law
is always viewed "from the outside," from the perspective of an observer
of legal institutions, doctrine and behavior, rather than that of a par-
ticipant.'

Thus the internal/external distinction has arisen in a variety of seem-
ingly unrelated contexts--involving the nature and study of rules, the

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