Thiers' declaration, "the gratitude of Italy will endure
in proportion to its feebleness" did not become famous
without grounds. Nor was Bismarck wrong when he
declared that the Mediterranean could not be divided
between kindred nations; especially so long as he was
there and ready to play upon the strings of their mutual
jealousy. Even after Bismarck had fallen, Crispi re-
mained; "he had listened too long to the Mephistoph-
eles of Berlin" ² to change the direction of his course
even if he wished. When he came to realize that Italy
was merely a lever for Germany and Austria to obtain
advantages for themselves, it was too late. We have
clear evidences of his disillusionment just before his
downfall in March, 1896. We find this note in his
diary upon occasion of a visit from Von Bülow:
". . . he declared that Germany would always be on
our side. I expressed some doubt of this. I said that
I had indeed perceived the advantages of the alliance
in Bismarck's day, but not afterwards with his suc-
cessors." ³ A little later, in a note to Germany, he
declared: ". . . The Italian people are not yet dis-
illusioned with regard to the alliance with Germany,
but who can guarantee that they may not be so to-
morrow, if things continue as they are." ⁴ His words
were prophetic. The disaster of Adowa dragged him
down in its wake and a new era in Franco-Italian rela-
tions began.

Before the year was over the new foreign minister,
the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, signed two conventions
with France which did away with the regime of capitu-

-78-