her colonial empire as established, while Germany was
still seeking a place in the sun. In commerce, France
and England had become natural allies, while Ger-
many had become England's most bitter rival. France
had long since given up any thoughts of challenging
Britain's naval supremacy; the Kaiser had declared
Germany's future was on the water. That England
needed France just as badly as France needed Eng-
land was almost self-evident; the only question was
whether the advantages to be gained were sufficient
to bring about a settlement of the outstanding differ-
ences.

Although France considered her colonial empire
practically established, its exact boundaries, and the
delimitations of spheres of influence were in many
places exceedingly vague. This was especially true
in the various regions where it came in contact with
the British Empire. Fashoda had shown that a settle-
ment could be reached even under the most difficult
conditions, but no government in France could live
through a second Fashoda. In fact any arrangement
of the future must be of such a sort that it would en-
tirely blot out the humiliation of 1898 -- it must be a
quid pro quo arrangement in which each side would
make concessions of approximately equal value, so
that when a basis should be finally reached, it would
stand firmly upon the foundations of a fair and just
compromise. Was it possible to make any such ar-
rangement between two nations who found their fields
of conflict in almost every part of the world, from New-
foundland to Morocco, from Siam to Madagascar, from
Egypt to the New Hebrides?

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