tection of German interests, but his second was more
truthful: "public opinion in Germany is such that the
Imperial Government can no longer seem to disinterest
itself in Moroccan affairs at a moment when France
and Spain no longer seem willing to abide by the Act
of Algeciras." ² But considering the fact that the Fez
expedition had already received orders to withdraw,
that Herr von Kiderlen had invited M. Cambon to
make an offer, and that the French ambassador was
in Paris for that very purpose, it was not clear why
Germany should seize this moment -- when France had
shown herself most willing to negotiate -- to provoke
an international crisis. In the words of M. Pierre
Albini, "A conversation was being held. Bruskly dur-
ing an interruption one of the two interlocutors placed
a revolver upon the table, then invited the other to
renew the discussion." ³

The answer was, after all, very simple. Under the
Act of Algeciras it was clear that France and Spain
would ultimately become masters of Morocco. Time
was working for them, and the chaotic condition exist-
ing there was bound to bring about a protectorate
sooner or later. The Accord of 1909 was an attempt
on the part of Germany to recoup commercially what
she had lost politically. It is possible that at first
she fully intended to disinterest herself gradually in
Morocco, but l'appétit vient en mangeant, and as
numerous profitable ventures suggested themselves
her subjects became more insistent in their demands
for equal participation with the French. When it was

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