edge of French policy, not so much perhaps, with regard to
the crisis immediately preceding the war as in respect to the
earlier period. The British and Italian archives are not yet
open at all. And any attempt to trace adequately the remoter
causes of the conflict would involve a study of all the Ger-
man but also of the Austrian records from 1866 onward --
obviously a travail de longue haleine."

My own concern with this "fascinating mystery" began in
my early years as a graduate student when I was in Professor
Lord's seminar on Bismarck's foreign policy and his assistant
in History 30a. For a number of years, I was occupied with
other aspects of Bismarck's career but my interest in the ori-
gins of the War of 1870 was rekindled by the publication of
Lord's book. During the years that followed, I watched with
special attention the publications that filled many of the gaps
he had noted in his preface. I hoped that he would take ac-
count of the revelations and would rewrite the story. As he
did not -- his interest and activity turned away when he left
Harvard -- I decided to undertake the task myself. I wanted
to discuss the project with him but he died a few months be-
fore I could visit him in Boston on my way, in 1954, to a year
of study in Europe. I never doubted, however, that I would
have his blessing; he welcomed revision of his knowledge by
the work of his students.

When I began this book, I thought that I could concentrate
my attention on the earlier history of the Hohenzollern Can-
didacy and give it its place in the international situation of the
time. Gradually I realized that this would not be enough; it
was necessary to examine again the evidence for the whole
course of the question. Given the materials at Lord's disposal,
his study was thorough and penetrating. The new evidence,
however, has upset some of his conjectures and conclusions.

Two groups of unpublished sources have been of outstanding
importance for me: the Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen papers in

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