joining a coalition. PPP, unlike in 1988, was able to establish its government in
the centre by forming a coalition with other parties whereas in Sindh, it held a
comfortable majority. ⁹⁸ It sought help from MQM in the initial few weeks leading
to the election of Benazir Bhutto as the Prime Minister, followed by Farooq
Leghari, a PPP leader, being elected as the country's President.

Pakistanis felt as if a long-awaited era of reconciliation had finally begun but,
soon, to their dismay, polarisation at the national and regional levels re-emerged.
Following some riots in Karachi and a rather sudden designation of a new
administrative district in the city in March 1994, MQM joined the opposition
coalition of Nawaz Sharif and Wali Khan. ⁹⁹ MQM, among other issues, had been
demanding the withdrawal of troops and an end to cases against its leadership,
to which the PPP regime did not agree. ¹⁰⁰ The situation in Karachi all through
the summer of 1994 remained tense with frequent cases of violence. However,
one noticed a new trend of violence specifically directed against the police and
army personnel, this gave an impression of erstwhile inter-ethnic conflict
replacing strife between the law enforcment authorities and the MQM snipers. It
also reaffirmed the continued absence of any wider political strategies and
meaningful dialogue to combat the the potential for violence.

It is difficult to write a 'postscript' on ethnic politics in Sindh as one may
presume various phases and strategies in the future political patterns in response
to changing political contours, given the plurality in the province. 'New' alliances
with the ethnic, regional and national parties cannot be dismissed giving way to
a politics of hostility and fascism or even of cooperation and harmony. There is
no threat to Pakistani statehood despite the inter-provincial, and to some extent,
inter-ethnic mobility within the country. The yearning for good governance is
powerful especially after a brief experience with the interim government led by
Moeen Qureshi, which has reasonably buoyed up a Pakistani desire and capacity
for an efficient administration. ¹⁰¹ However, dynastic cliques, the exploitation of
the masses by pseudo-democratic elements and the profusion of drug and gun-
related interests, inter-personal or inter-sectional factionalism may remain the
hall-mark of ethnic activism until the Pakistani middle class establishes a
political culture of national consensus based on decentralisation and democratic
accountability.

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