At least part of the answer appears to be that we saw Vietnam as unique rather than in strategic context. This misperception grew out of our neglect of military strategy in the post-World War II nuclear era. Almost all of the professional literature on military strategy was written by civilian analysts -- political scientists from the academic world and systems analysts from the Defense community. In his book War and Politics, political scientist Bernard Brodie devoted an entire chapter to the lack of professional military strategic thought. ² The same criticism was made by systems analysts Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith who commented: "Military professionals are among the most infrequent contributors to the basic literature on military strategy and defense policy. Most such contributors are civilians. . . ." ³ Even the Army's so-called "new" strategy of flexible response grew out of civilian, not military, thinking.

This is not to say that the civilian strategists were wrong. The political scientists provided a valuable service in tying war to its political ends. They provided answers to "why" the United States ought to wage war. In like manner the systems analysts provided answers on "what" means we would use. What was missing was the link that should have been provided by the military strategists -- "how" to take the systems analyst's means and use them to achieve the political scientist's ends.

But instead of providing professional military advice on how to fight the war, the military more and more joined with the systems analysts in determining the material means we were to use. Indeed, the conventional wisdom among many Army officers was that "the Army doesn't make strategy," and "there is no such thing as Army strategy." There was a general feeling that strategy was budget-driven and was primarily a function of resource allocation. The task of the Army, in their view, was to design and procure material, arms and equipment and to organize, train, and equip soldiers for the Defense Establishment.

These attitudes derive in part from a shallow interpretation of the Army's mission. While it is true that the NationalSecurity Act

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