THE fundamental United States naval policy is "To maintain the Navy in
strength and readiness to uphold national policies and interests, and to guard
the United States and its continental and overseas possessions."

In time of peace, when the threats to our national security change with the
strength and attitude of other nations in the world who have a motive for making war
upon us and who are--or think they are--strong enough to do so, it is frequently
difficult to evaluate those threats and translate our requirements into terms of ships
and planes and trained men. It is one thing to say that we must have and maintain a
Navy adequate to uphold national policies and interests and to protect us against
potential enemies, but it is another thing to decide what is and what is not the naval
strength adequate for that purpose.

In the years following World War I, our course was clear enough--to make every
reasonable effort to preserve world peace by eliminating the causes of war and failing
in that effort, to do our best to stay clear of war, while recognizing that we might fail
in doing so. For a number of years, the likelihood of our becoming involved in a war in
the foreseeable future appeared remote, and our fortunate geographical position
gave us an added sense of security. Under those circumstances, and in the interest of
national economy, public opinion favored the belief that we could get along with a
comparatively small Navy. Stated in terms of personnel this meant an average of
about 7,900 commissioned officers, all of whom had chosen the Navy as a career, and
100,000 enlisted men more or less.

This modest concept of an adequate Navy carried with it an increased
responsibility on the part of the Navy to maintain itself at the peak of operational and
material efficiency, with a nucleus of highly trained personnel as a basis for war time
expansion.

For twenty years in its program of readiness, our Navy has worked under sched-
ules of operation, competitive training and inspection, unparalleled in any other
Navy of the world. Fleet problems, tactical exercises, amphibious operations with the
Marines and Army, aviation, gunnery, engineering, communications were all inte-
grated in a closely packed annual operation schedule. This in turn was supplemented
by special activities ashore and afloat calculated to train individuals in the funda-
mentals of their duties and at the same time give them the background of experience
so necessary for sound advances in the various techniques of naval warfare. Ship com-
petitions established for the purpose of stimulating and maintaining interest were
climaxed by realistic fleet maneuvers held once a year, with the object of giving

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