wished to explain our belief that we often ought
to obey the laws as an inexact way of thinking
about some other fact, such as that it pays us to
obey them.

My object, then, is to show that all attempts to
explain this recognition of political obligations in
terms of something else lead to confusion, self-
contradiction, and the evident misdescription of
facts which we cannot doubt. I shall only deal with
the contents of the works discussed, however impor-
tant and interesting, so far as seems necessary for this
object.

The second and shorter part of the book, which I
have called analytical, as distinct from historical, will,
I fear, rightly incur the charge of falling between two
stools. I might, it may be said, have contented myself
with criticism and refrained from offering any posi-
tive doctrine, or I might have attempted a complete
moral philosophy. But the first course would have
been justly blamed as unfair. All criticism implies
some positive belief, and in honest critic is bound to
disclose this as well as he can. The second course,
however desirable could it be adequately carried out,
was not possible for me; yet I did not wish to put off
saying what seemed to me true and worth saying until
I could say, with a conviction of its truth, everything
that would be worth saying on the subject. In my
second part, then, I have merely tried to indicate such
positive beliefs as I seemed committed to by my criti-
cisms in the first part.

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