OF the numerous and, indeed, unforeseen problems which, at the
very outset, the world war offered to the Governments engaged in
it, none presented itself with greater acuteness or on a larger scale
than that of food supply.

The history of previous wars afforded no indications that might
contribute to its solution, because in them, terrible as some of them
had been, only the armed forces of the belligerents had in fact been
involved; the life of the whole country had not been suspended, and
the normal methods of supply and distribution had sufficed to meet
requirements.

Here, on the contrary, was a struggle which it was soon evident
would be one of endurance, in which entire nations with all their
moral and material forces and means of action were engaged. The
allied peoples and their Governments were obliged to adapt them-
selves to its conditions and to set up, under penalty of seeing their
populations starved and defeated, a complete system of food supply
and distribution such as had never before been contemplated.

In France in particular the question had to be faced as early as
the end of 1914. Before the war, thanks to her favorable geographi-
cal situation, to the diversity of her climates, and to the fertility of
her soil, France was able to supply the greater part of the essential
requirements of her population. Her harvests yielded 90 million
quintals ¹ of wheat, a quantity approximately equal to her consump-
tion; her production of sugar exceeded her needs; an abundant and
varied live-stock yielded all the meat, milk, and milk products re-
quired; the vineyards of the South, the orchards of Normandy and
Brittany, furnished ample supplies of wine and cider. Imports of
foodstuffs comprised, in consequence, only a limited number of
commodities and in relatively small amounts: dried vegetables,
190,000 tons; oil-seeds, 900,000 tons; rice, 260,000 tons; coffee,
110,000 tons; tea, 1300 tons; cocoa, 30,000 tons.

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