A month later, Nye told reporters that during his trip to China, PLA officers had
asked him how the United States would react to a military crisis over Taiwan. In
a classic statement of ambiguity, but a statement that nonetheless was absolutely
true, Nye said he responded: "Nobody knows." Citing the U.S. decision to go to
war in Korea in 1950, he told the Chinese, "It shows that you cannot know the
answer to these things." Nye warned, however, that the dangers of escalation in the
Taiwan Strait "could be catastrophic." ⁹⁰

The U.S. military under President Clinton believed dialogue with the PLA and
frequent high-level military-to-military exchanges were vital to prevent the United
States and China from drifting into an adversarial relationship in the future. Such
interaction, aimed at greater mutual understanding and transparency, was seen as
urgent as both sides interacted with greater frequency in the Asian Pacific. At the
same time, the Pentagon made it clear that U.S. interests in peace and stability in
the Western Pacific remained unchanged. On December 19-20, 1995, the U.S.
aircraft carrier Nimitz and its escort battle group sailed through the Taiwan Strait
en route to a port call in Hong Kong, ostensibly because bad weather forced it to
sail to the west as opposed to the east of Taiwan. Nearly everyone interpreted the
transit as a military signal to Beijing to avoid using force against Taiwan, ⁹¹ which
had just held a legislative election in which the KMT barely managed to sustain a
majority. ⁹²

By 1995 the Clinton administration conceded that a new geopolitical order was
being created due to the emergence of China as one of the world's most powerful
nations. The United States was willing to accept that fact, as well as the inevitabil-
ity that as China became a world power, there would be times when China's
interests would parallel those of the United States and times when those interests
would conflict. The administration determined that the best way to deal with an
emerging China was to engage it in as broad a scope of contacts as possible.
Containment was rejected as an alternative approach, but in fact few Americans
wanted to contain or isolate China. The idea of engaging China was, of course, not
new; it had been the policy of every administration since Richard Nixon. The U.S.
objective also had been consistent: to ensure that as China increased its power, it
would do so as a responsible member of the international community, cooperative
with the United States, and not a spoiler of international security, political, and
economic regimes.

During 1995 the Clinton strategy of comprehensive engagement with China was
severely tested, as it would be in 1996. To preserve its strategy of engagement, the
Clinton administration was very accommodating to the PRC on issues such as MFN
and human rights, while generally protective of U.S. interests on issues such as
Taiwan, trade, and nonproliferation. The Taiwan issue presented the most

-233-