claims regarding knowledge, truth, and the nature of existence that are
inherent in and intimately linked to the dominant traditions in Western
moral theory. This influence is evident in the 'new normative theory' in
international relations, much of which remains narrow in its modes of
moral reasoning and use of moral concepts and is preoccupied with
questions regarding the justification of moral action--of the 'rightness'
or 'wrongness' of moral claims based on their epistemological status.
The aim of this book is to broaden the scope of our thinking about
ethics in the context of global social relations, first, through a critique of
the 'leading traditions' in international ethics, and second, through an
exploration of the ways in which certain strands of feminist moral phi-
losophy may offer us an alternative perspective from which to view
ethics in international relations. This single aim, then, serves a dual
purpose in that it addresses and seeks to broaden and enrich not one
but two academic debates.

First, it seeks to expand the debate on 'normative theory' in interna-
tional relations by bringing in the important contributions from feminist
moral theory--contributions which are noticeably absent from the debate.
One of the key objectives of this book, then, is to demonstrate that a femi-
nist ethics--and particularly, ideas surrounding what is widely known as
the 'ethics of care'--can offer insights regarding the nature of morality,
moral motivation, and moral relations which could move the debate in in-
ternational relations theory beyond its currently narrow frontiers.

The arguments of this book also address the literature on and debates
surrounding feminist ethics, and specifically the common criticism of the
ethics of care that it is personal and parochial and therefore 'unable to ad-
dress large-scale social or global problems', and that its focus on 'atten-
tion to intimates and proximate strangers can lead to neglecting those
who are further away'. ¹ I argue that it is indeed the case that an 'ortho-
dox' reading of care ethics may be an untenable basis on which to con-
struct an approach to moral relations for the contemporary global con-
text. What is required, instead, is what I call a 'critical ethics of care',
which is characterized by a relational ontology--that is, it starts from the
premise that people live in and perceive the world within social relation-
ships; moreover, this approach recognizes that these relationships are
both a source of moral motivation and moral responsiveness and a basis
for the construction and expression of power and knowledge. The moral
values of an approach to international ethics based on care, then, are cen-
tred on the maintenance and promotion of good personal and social rela-
tions among concrete persons, both within and across existing communi-
ties. These values, I argue, are relevant not only to small-scale or existing
personal attachments but to all levels of social relations and, thus, to in-
ternational or global relations.

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