It has been argued by Steve Smith that we are experiencing a resurgence
of normative theory in IR. ² Indeed, he made this claim in 1992 in a review
of a new book by Chris Brown called International Relations Theory: New
Normative Approaches. ³ Brown gave readers an introduction to normative
theory in IR, which he described as

that body of work which addresses the moral dimension of international re-
lations and the wider questions of meaning and interpretation generated by
the discipline. At its most basic it addresses the ethical nature of the relations
between communities/states, whether in the context of the old agenda,
which focused on violence and war, or the new(er) agenda, which mixes
these traditional concerns with the modern demand for international dis-
tributive justice.

This was in contrast to empirical theory, which Brown described as 'de-
scriptive, explanatory and predictive, attempting to provide an accurate
account of how the world works'. ⁴ Six years earlier, Mervyn Frost book,
Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations--which was rewrit-
ten and republished in 1996--argued that normative problems in IR are
those that require of us that we make judgements about what ought to be
done. Normative questions, he claimed, are not answered by pointing to
the way things are in the world. ⁵

I would argue, however, that while such a conceptualization of norma-
tive theory has been both important and useful in highlighting and reviv-
ing the debates in ethics and political philosophy which have been ig-
nored by, despite being crucial to, IR theory, the strict delineation of what
counts as normative theory could also be seen as harmful and restricting.
Much of what is currently described as ethics in international relations is
characterized by, first, ethical arguments which are primarily justificatory
in nature, and second, the use of a limited number of moral concepts in
building those arguments: specifically, rights, obligations or duties, con-
tracts, fairness, reciprocity, autonomy, and justice. When I say that the ar-
guments are justificatory, I mean that they focus on constructing princi-
ples which can be applied to situations to find reasons which justify the
taking of action; as Frost says, all the normative questions in IR can be en-
capsulated in one central question: 'What in general is a good reason for
action by or with regard to states?' ⁶ These arguments are concerned with
the epistemological status of moral judgements--the construction of prin-
ciples to determine right and wrong. Because the moral concepts de-
scribed earlier are limited in number, the modes of moral reasoning used
are, in general, deontological-liberal or liberal-contractualist in nature.

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