assortment of subdisciplines along with cognitive psychology, engineering, neu-
ropsychology, and artificial intelligence.

The relation between folk psychology and scientific psychology has become an
important topic in cognitive science, spawning several anthologies and a host of
articles in philosophical journals. The thesis of eliminative materialism, in partic-
ular, has come under considerable attack, with more than one philosopher springing
to the defense of folk psychology. In due course, I discuss what I take to be some
of the key arguments advanced in this arena (especially in chapter 7). In so doing,
I argue that the discussion in the philosophical literature has assumed an unduly
simplistic notion of what folk psychology amounts to, and that much can be learned
from consulting the relevant research in social psychology or social cognition.

It turns out, for example, that the most rigorous empirical analysis of the
rationality or scientific credibility of folk cognition, combined with a good dose of
theoretical argument, has taken place in social psychology, not cognitive psychol-
ogy. However, philosophers working within the cognitive science tradition have,
by and large, not consulted this extensive literature. In contrast, in this book I
extensively review both the empirical research and associated theoretical disputes
from social psychology in addressing the relation between folk psychology and
scientific psychology.

Not that social psychologists, or, indeed, any other kind of psychologist, speak
with one voice in assessing the scientific value of folk psychology. As in philo-
sophical circles, the popular attitudes toward common sense in psychology have
gone through cycles, with dissenting voices, of course, always present.

Radical behaviorism, for example, is famously derogatory about common sense.
Its most noted proponent, Skinner ( 1974), wrote:

The disastrous results of common sense in the management of behavior are evident
in every walk of life, from international affairs to the care of a baby, and we shall
continue to be inept in these fields, until a scientific analysis clarifies the advantage
of a more effective technology. It will then be obvious that the results are due to more
than common sense. (p. 234)

However, it is not merely that Skinner preferred science to common sense. Rather
he viewed folk psychology as the central impediment to the development of science
and human progress. Thus, Skinner ( 1978) wrote that the main obstacle to the
utilization of behavioral science is "the entrenchment of old practices--in this case
the old ways of thinking about human behavior. Antiquated theories ingrained in
our language and our culture stand in the way of promising scientific alternatives"
(p. 85 ).

The history of social psychology also reveals attitudes and views that range from
the reverential to the dismissive. One of the founders of modern social psychology,
Heider, attempted to develop an understanding of lay psychology by careful
conceptual analysis of the theoretical structures underlying everyday language.
Heider ( 1958) argued that the analysis of these conceptual structures could play an
important role in describing lay cognitive processes, and in developing a theory to

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