Shortly after 5:00 P.M. on October 17, 1989, an earthquake shook the San
Francisco Bay area. The quake, later called "Loma Prieta" by geologists,
rocked the area for about ten seconds with a force measuring 7.1 on the
Richter scale ( U.S. Geological Survey 1990). Severe damage was reported
within a hundred-mile radius around the quake's epicenter (located eight
miles northeast of Santa Cruz); tremors were felt for several hundred miles
in all directions. The quake destroyed or damaged thousands of buildings.
Roads were cracked open and bridges crumbled. Natural gas and power
lines snapped apart, water pipes exploded, and structural fires erupted ev-
erywhere. In all, there were more than sixty deaths, thousands of injuries,
and an estimated $6.8 billion in direct damages ( The October 17, 1989,
Loma Prieta Earthquake 1990, 4). ¹

Another major disaster had occurred while the nation was still reeling
from Hugo's destructive rampage through the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico,
and the Carolinas. And, to make matters worse, the earthquake was actually
seen on television by millions of Americans who were preparing to watch
the third game of the World Series, being held in San Francisco's Candle-
stick Park. The governmental response system was put into effect once
again. This time, private citizens and public institutions reacted calmly and
quickly. Consequently, the gap between emergent norms and bureaucratic
procedures was initially quite small in California. Over time, however, the
gap increased in size. This was the joint result of a growing sense of
frustration and the local governments' departures from their preestablished
role in the recovery process. The size of the gap had a direct impact on the
implementation of disaster assistance. More specifically, it produced an-
other example of the confusion pattern, or the breakdown in orderly cooper-
ation and coordination between levels of government. Therefore, the
government's disaster-response efforts received mixed reviews.

-113-