perception and organized action systems at birth to the sense of self and others as differentiated and reciprocal agents by 2 months that leads to the sense of self and others as differentiated and reciprocal agents who can reciprocate as well as cooperate by the end of the first year. At this point in development, infants are starting to take an intentional stance in addition to the contemplative stance they develop by 2 months of age. In a final discussion, we speculate on the possible mechanisms underlying this devel- opment. But first, we set the stage by presenting some general considerations regarding the specificity of social knowledge in comparison to physical knowledge and the specific processes underlying social cognition, namely intersubjective mechanisms. SPECIFICITY OF SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE The understanding of people determines special knowledge and entails much more than physical knowledge. Although people have bodies, and physical knowledge can account for part of their behavior (e.g., the fact that they can move on their own, can hide or fall, are subject to the forces of gravity, and cannot be at two different locations at the same time), monitoring people and predicting what they are going to do next entails skills that go far beyond physical understanding. Understanding people also defines special processes. Social cognition entails the reading of affects, emotions, intentions, and subtle reciprocities: all the things that make people fundamentally different from objects. In other words, it entails the understanding of a private or dispositional world, what people feel and what characterizes their individual inclinations. But how do we get access to such understanding? To a large extent, people reveal themselves in the way they reciprocate to us and how, via reciprocity, they convey a sense of shared experience. The same is true for animals and pets. Understanding an animal of a particular species observed in the wild or at a zoo, even for extended periods of time, is different from the understanding of the same animal raised as a pet and with whom we share our life. A sense of shared expe- rience adds to social understanding and gives deeper access to the dispo- sitional characteristics of individuals, whether they are humans or nonhu- mans. The sense of shared experience that emerges from reciprocity is captured by the term intersubjectivity. We will use this term extensively in this chapter, because we believe that the emerging sense of shared expe- rience determines the early development of social cognition. Intersubjectivity entails a basic differentiation between the self and oth- ers as well as a capacity to compare and project one's own private experi- ence onto another (e.g., the "like me" stance). Pet owners obviously un- -5- |