and Egypt have had European armies of occupation
inflicted upon them simply to satisfy the demands of
the haute finance. To-day the question is not so much
whether a nation is strong enough to make war, as
whether its Government is powerful enough to prevent
war. For example, united Germany has hitherto used
her strength only to maintain European peace; while
the weakness of a neighbouring Government continues
to involve the gravest risk of war.

It was, indeed, from such a condition of relations
that the war of 1870-71 originated. A Napoleon on
the throne of France was bound to justify his preten-
sions by political and military successes. Only tempor-
arily was the French nation contented by the victories
of its arms in remote fields of war; the triumphs of
the Prussian armies excited jealousy, they were regarded
as arrogant, as a challenge; and the French demanded
revenge for Sadowa. The liberal spirit of the epoch
set itself against the autocratic Government of the
Emperor; he was forced to make concessions, his
internal authority was weakened, and one day the
nation was informed by its representatives that it
desired war with Germany.

The wars carried on by France beyond seas, essentially
on behalf of financial interests, had consumed immense
sums and had undermined the discipline of the army.
Her army was by no means in thorough preparedness
for a great war, but, in the temper of the nation, the
Spanish succession question furnished an opportune
pretext on which to go to war. The French Reserves
were called out on July 15th, and, as if the opportunity
for a rupture was on no account to be let slip, only

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