law, unencumbered by the restraints of third parties with ajudicatory power.
The modern history of international tribunals, including ad hoc arbitration
panels, the Permanent Court of Arbitration set up by The Hague Conventions
of 1899 and 1907, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) created
by the League of Nations, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) created
with the United Nations, has been plagued with this debate. Examining how
these bodies dealt with the jurisdictional questions inherent in cases before them
will add to the conclusions reached by the end of this book.

The special focus of this book shall be on this jurisdictional problem,
examining the distinction that has been drawn between legal and non-legal, or
political, issues. I will investigate the history of this debate, in the theoretical
work of scholars, in the words of international agreements, and in the practical
work of various international tribunals.

There are certain definitional questions that should be dealt with at this point,
regarding the words jurisdiction and justiciability. Jurisdiction is the widest of
these terms, defined by Black's Law Dictionary as "the power of the court to
decide a matter in controversy and presupposes the existence of a duly
constituted court with control over the subject matter and the parties."
Justiciable is defined by Black's as that which "refers to a real and substantial
controversy which is appropriate for judicial determination."

One aspect of this jurisdictional debate has suggested that there are some
issues which, by their very nature, are non-justiciable. The solution to such
problems cannot be found through the law. Rather, these problems must be
solved through the give and take methods of the political process. In short,
some issues are legal, some are political, and these two categories are
distinguishable. (Greater definition of this distinction will be found in the words
of scholars and courts, contained throughout the rest of the book.) Through
document analysis, case study, and doctrinal examination, this book means to
discover whether or not such a political question doctrine exists in international
law.

What will be seen by the end of this work is that in international law,
justiciable has been something of a nebulous term, having meaning only as states
give it meaning. In other words, states have attempted unilaterally to decide
what is appropriate for judicial determination. The result is that the meaning of
justiciable has fluctuated from state to state, from issue to issue, and across
time. As this research will also show, however, the ICJ has had its own
thoughts in determining what is appropriate. And, as a result of the
International Court of Justice's actions, justiciable may need redefining. That
will be taken up in Chapter 5.

(Immediately, attention should be drawn to a possible terminology problem
that could arise for any reader familiar with U.S. constitutional law. In U.S.
constitutional law, there is a political question doctrine that attends to relations
between the various branches of the government. When international law

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