the competitive national state system of
the previous century without touching
the roots of discontent and conflict within
that system. Its greatest weakness, these
critics insist, was its failure to recognize
economic realities, to see the necessity
for economic units transcending national
boundaries, and to remove the forms of
economic injustice which bred strife
within the existing capitalist systems.
Again a third verdict has presented a
critical compromise. Neither the New
Order nor the Old Order had been suc-
cessfully secured. The New, suggested
one writer, merely "fouled the Old."

Whatever the major weaknesses of the
treaty were thought to be, all critics
could find plausible proof of their con-
tentions in the turbulent history of the
decades since 1919. The work of the
Paris Peace Conference has been vari-
ously blamed for American isolationism,
for the rise of Hitler, for economic de-
pression, for the appeasement policies
of the democracies, for World War II,
and for the initial rupture between Soviet
Russia and the West. But the Treaty of
Versailles has never lacked its defenders.
Pointing to the difficulties confronting
the Peace Conference as well as to its
substantial achievements, they condemn
later statesmen for throwing away the
opportunities for a new international
order offered by the treaty.

No single aspect in the controversy has
attracted more attention than the figure
of Woodrow Wilson. Most of the hopes
and fears of the world centered around
the American president when he arrived
in Paris for the conference. Most of the
later blame or praise has centered around
the part he played there. Both his critics
and his defenders agree in assigning to
Wilson the major responsibility for the
outcome of the Peace Conference. His
was the program from which it started.
He was the key figure in fighting for that
program during the conference. If the
peace seems too harsh, Wilson is cen-
sured for betraying his principles dur-
ing the negotiations. If the treaty is
judged not to provide adequate security
for France, Wilson is held responsible
for softening French demands. Whether
the international structure envisaged in
the treaty is considered too utopian or
too reactionary, the responsibility in
either case is attributed to the weakness
of Wilson's program. Moderate defenders
conclude at least that the results of the
conference would have been far worse
without Wilson's program and his pres-
ence. Those who find much to praise in
the peace generally give credit to Wilson
for its merits. Above all, others claim,
Wilson forced upon the attention of the
world the ideal of an international or-
ganization which remains the best hope
of the future.

The readings selected here conse-
quently focus upon the role of Woodrow
Wilson in shaping the Treaty of Ver-
sailles. They raise a central question.
How wise was ' Wilson's diplomacy at
Versailles? Informed conclusions on this
central problem, it will be apparent, in-
volve judgments upon two somewhat
separate issues. Was Wilson's program
a wise basis for construction of the
peace? And did Wilson effectively use
the means at his disposal for shaping the
treaty as far as possible along the lines
of his program?

An opening selection by the distin-
guished diplomatic historian Samuel F.
Bemis provides a relatively objective
treatment of the essential facts for under-
standing the nature of Wilson's peace
program and the extent to which it was
embodied in the treaty. Thereafter the
selections follow substantially the chron-
ological order in which they were writ-

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