and young, rich and poor seem willing to die in defense of their
principles." ³

Clark then posed the critical question: "Can you explain to me why
there should be such a different state of feeling in your state from
what I have above described. Is it not strange, when the border states
suffer so much more from Northern fanaticism, from actual loss in
their property, and these same states equally interested in slavery,
that a feeling of antagonism to the North, should be so much stron-
ger [in the Gulf States]. I cannot understand it. It cannot be that we
have more excitable and demagogue politicians to lead the people,
because I know the people in this state have been far ahead of the
politicians."

Upper South Unionists considered the behavior of the lower South
similarly incomprehensible. Former Tennessee Governor William B.
Campbell thought the cotton states had no legitimate complaints
about the federal government. He tried to persuade an Alabama
cousin that secession was "unwise and impolitic," liable to speed "the
ruin and overthrow of negro slavery" and to jeopardize "the freedom
and liberty of the white man." Like many upper South Unionists,
Campbell condemned irresponsible politicians for stampeding peo-
ple in the deep South and creating "estrangement" between the up-
per and lower South. He warned that Tennessee and Kentucky would
never be "dragged into a rebellion that their whole population ut-
terly disapproved." ⁴

To anticipate themes that will be developed below, especially in
Chapters 6 and 7, this study concludes that one must take into ac-
count both slaveholding and previous patterns of party allegiance to
understand why the upper and lower South took such different
stances during the months after Lincoln's election. High-slaveowning
areas across the South generally displayed more support for seces-
sion, and slaveowning was more concentrated in the lower than the
upper South. Deep South secessionists also benefited from virtually
unchallenged statewide Democratic majorities. The party's radical
Southern Rights wing planted seeds of poisonous suspicion that sud-
denly sprouted in late 1860, creating popular attitudes such as those
described by William M. Clark. Closer two-party competition in the
upper South, however, gave Whiggish opponents of secession a sub-
stantial nucleus from which to build. Antisecessionists there, using a
new "Union party" label, could thus overwhelm the initial secession-
ist challenge.

THREE waves of change, each successively larger than the other,
washed over and fundamentally reshaped political contours in Vir-

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