In order to achieve their economic objectives, working-
men have found it necessary to join together and to take action to-
gether against employers. Labor's weapons of self-help, therefore, in-
volve combinations and concerted action which run counter to the
basic principles of our system of free competition. The American public
has always had a deep distrust of powerful combinations which, through
the potent force of collective action, can interfere with the normal
working of competitive markets. This outlook is reflected in the Sher-
man Antitrust Act, which, though directed primarily at big business,
purported to outlaw all combinations in restraint of trade. It is not sur-
prising, then, that during the early years of union organization, trade
unions found that the techniques which they adopted to obtain mem-
bers and to improve working conditions met with a hostile reception in
the courts and were often equated with conspiracy.

It is against this kind of historical background that we now turn
to examine labor's struggle to free its organizing activities from the
restraining hand of the judiciary. In this connection, we shall discuss in
detail the provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act and the various
Supreme Court cases construing it which have, through liberal interpre-
tation of that legislation, given organized labor a measure of freedom
in the economic arena which critics declare detrimental to the public
interest. Finally, we shall consider how the Norris-La Guardia Act, by
freeing labor from regulation under the antitrust laws, has given rise to
a demand for new legislation which would apply the antitrust laws to
certain aspects of organized labor's activities.

The basic economic and social environment in the United States
has, on the whole, been hostile to the development of union organiza-
tion. In a land of opportunity, rich in natural resources and capable of
providing a high standard of living to its wage earners, trade unions

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