All this is very well. But to denominate society as
an organism and the individual as a political and social
animal is by no means to make it clear how and why the
interests of individuals are essentially harmonious. And
it seems to me that the emphasis placed at present upon
the essential unity of society is apt to leave one with
the impression that the harmony of individual interests
is somehow miraculously preestablished. For example,
Professor Dewey goes so far as to argue that unless the
individual has an instinctive and inherent (i.e., heredi-
tary) interest in the well-being of others, he never can
be brought to make it an object of genuine considera-
tion, and any coordination of interests will then be
forever "artificial" and ineffective. Yet, assuming the
hereditary basis, assuming that the individual is the
hereditary product of society (which, of course, I decline
to assume ³ ), it by no means follows that his needs and
his instincts are in harmony with those of his fellows.
Is it not, indeed, a common complaint of parents that
their children prefer to have their own way? And in our
human family as a whole shall we not say that strife and
discord are at least as conspicuous as harmony and
cooperation? If we are to show that, in spite of all this,
the interests of individuals are still "essentially" in
harmony, then it is for us to point out that "essential"
attribute of the individual -- and of the individual him-
self -- from which this harmony may be derived and to
justify the derivation. To define this attribute, and to
make the derivation clear, is one of the main objects of
these lectures. In this First Lecture, however, I shall
offer only a general and preliminary analysis, less in the
interest of concrete fact than of the logic of the idealistic
theory. My point will be, then, that just as a conflict

-26-