on the horizon, however, for the international community to move forcefully to
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, the dispute often identified at the center of any
Middle East crisis, the time bomb threatening the whole area.

The Gulf War and the anti-Israeli uprising have seriously affected the nation-
alist cause and political aspirations for both Jews and Palestinians. The latter
group suffered economically to maintain the intifada momentum, and Palestinians
sustained financial losses as a result of the Kuwait occupation. On the diplomatic
front, maverick alignment with the Iraqi policies of Saddam Hussein compro-
mised the growing support and sympathy for the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO). Meanwhile, the Israeli policies in the West Bank and Gaza held
down Palestinian independence but led to considerable criticism of the Jewish
state. The unprovoked Iraqi missile attacks on Tel Aviv, however, evoked sym-
pathy from the world community, including some Arab states, and underscored
the role of Israel as a pariah in the conglomeration of Middle East countries.
Self-determination in the name of nationalism remains the chief goal for Pal-
estinians; recognition and national security are still primary goals for Israel.

These major unresolved issues continue to appear as agenda items on most
Middle East negotiation proposals for settling outstanding claims regardless of
the origin of the particular conflict. Advocates of an international peace confer-
ence have sought to centralize this theme as the key to any brokered political
harmony in the region. There is a strong tendency to collect all political disputes
among Middle East actors into a massive, holistic form and to designate the core
problem as the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such perceptions influence the outside world
and help shape the dominant image that defines the current Middle East political
environment. Two recent events in the international arena illustrate how this
process works.

First, shortly after the Gulf crisis began in August 1990, Saddam Hussein proposed a linkage between the question of a Palestinian homeland and with-
drawal of Iraqi military troops from Kuwait. Trading concessions across political
issues had little appeal to the United States or other members of the international
community, yet the crossover from one problem to another presented an op-
portunity to promote a wider Middle East settlement, specifically including ne-
gotiation over the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Second, just one month before the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian Gulf,
in December 1990--when the world was preoccupied with the escalating conflict
stemming from the Iraq-Kuwait-Saudi Arabia crisis--the United Nations Se-
curity Council drafted a resolution reflecting the perpetually drawn interconnec-
tions, saying it felt that the "convening at an appropriate time of an international
peace conference on the Middle East properly structured, with the participation
of the parties concerned, would facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive
settlement and lasting peace in the Middle East" ("U.S. Joins U.N. Vote against
Israel," 1990). After war broke out, France proposed anew that an international
peace conference on the Middle East be held after the fighting concluded, and
the European community gave its endorsement to the idea.

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