parents' community' ( Teichman 1982: 178). Marriage is (surpris- ingly) omitted from the definition because Teichman has implicit- ly decided in advance that certain disadvantaged statuses related to birth but not to marriage should count as 'illegitimacy', for example, the status of the Jewish Mamzer. 8 She does not to my mind escape the ontological trap by taking refuge in Wittgensteinian 'core-definitions' and 'penumbra concepts', 9 for she must still site, in ontological fashion, the concept- or definition-centre, however much she wishes to leave its exterior limits undefined. 10 Marriage and legitimacy are in fact reciprocally defined in tradi- tional anthropology. The Royal Anthropological Institute's Notes and Queries defines marriage as follows: 'Marriage is a union between a man and woman such that children born to the woman are recognised legitimate offspring of both partners' ( Royal Anthropological Institute 1951: 111). Leach, however, has argued that this definition breaks down in the context of polyandry. 11 We shall see that in classical Athens at any rate marriage by betrothal (engyē) and legitimacy (gnēsiotēs) do appear to have been recipro- cally defined. There is one small and rather negative fashion in which comparative material from non-Greek societies can actually be useful and unproblematic in application: it can be used to expose fallacious assumptions, as the history of the Scottish Debate, to which we shall turn shortly, well illustrates. Any more positive, paradigm-building use of it can strictly possess no more than a rhetorical value. However, any study of one society by an individual socialized in another involves an unavoidable implicit comparison between the two. 'Bastardy' is a modern English word and concept, not an ancient Greek one. 12 To analyse together that series of institutions, or fragments of institutions, from ancient Greece that might superficially correspond to our notion of 'bastardy' might, in Greek terms, be a very arbitrary and misleading exercise. Teichman 1982 book again serves to illustrate the point. She seeks to generate a universal definition of 'illegitimacy' by ____________________ | 10 | Cf. Wittgenstein 1953: 66-7 and 1958: 17-18 and Needham 1971: 29-32. | | 11 | Leach 1971: 105-13. | | 12 | As acknowledged by Patterson 1990: 41. | | 8 | Teichman 1982: 23, 85, 138, and 181. | | 9 | Ibid.: 23 and 75-6. | -5- |