Italy. The strategic nightmare of military planners in the Habsburg Monar-
chy was that they would have to fight a coalition that included all of these
countries. As the war itself would show, this worst case assessment of
fighting simultaneously on several fronts was not farfetched.

The German general staff wrestled with the strategic problem of plan-
ning for a two-front war against France and Russia. German military
planners were forced to choose the front to attack, where to defend, and
what balance of forces were necessary to carry out these tasks. Their
solution was an audacious "win-hold-win" strategy--the famous Schlief-
fen Plan--in which the German army would concentrate the bulk of its
strength against France in an attempt to achieve a quick victory. The
German army's leadership thought that it would take only eight weeks after
the order to mobilize for them to beat France. While Germany sought to
win quickly against France, German forces in the eastern theater of war
would defend against an expected Russian invasion. Germany's ability to
carry out the Schlieffen Plan rested on the ability of German forces, sup-
ported by the armies fielded by its ally Austria-Hungary, to prevent Russia
from scoring a major military success in eastern Europe. During the initial
period of war, Germany's leaders wanted to postpone a military decision
on the Russian front while they defeated the French army. Defensive
operations against Russia thus played an integral part in German plans for
an offensive campaign in France. After destroying the French army in battle,
the German army would then redeploy against Russia. Only after the defeat
of France could Germany mass sufficient forces in the east to defeat Russia.

My analysis of prewar planning shows that military decision makers in
Austria-Hungary and Germany were not mindless "cultists," who behaved
irrationally because of an addiction to offensive operations. Instead, the
general staffs in both countries carefully examined and elaborated defen-
sive strategies as well as offensive strikes. Offensives were thought of as a
means to achieve a quick outcome, whereas the defense was intended to
hold on a front in an attempt to delay a military decision. Military planners
in Germany, for example, rejected the notion of a major offensive against
Russia, in large part because they could not see how it would lead to a
war-winning outcome.

Of course, the opening offensives by Austria-Hungary and Germany
failed to deliver a short war. Because they failed, these offensives are often
derided as reckless ventures that ignored strategic and operational realities.
Yet, a close examination of the opening campaigns of the war shows that
the offensive strikes launched by Austria-Hungary and Germany were not
preordained to failure. France and Russia found it very difficult to defeat
the attacks that were launched against them. Austria-Hungary's attack into
Russia almost succeeded in encircling and annihilating a Russian army at
the Battle of Komarov. Meanwhile, to frustrate the Schlieffen Plan and halt
Germany's onslaught, the French army needed to make a tremendous

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