cipal criticisms leveled at MI theory; and to forecast possible future
work. At the end of this introduction are bibliographical references for
materials that are not treated further in the book itself.

At the time I wrote Frames of Mind, I had not fully anticipated the
extent to which most people continued to adhere to two assumptions
about intelligence: first, that it is a single, general capacity that every
human being possesses to a greater or lesser extent; and that, however
defined, it can be measured by standardized verbal instruments, such as
short-answer, paper-and-pencil tests. In an effort to help new readers to
enter the work, and to forestall these widely held but ultimately unten-
able conceptions, I ask you to perform two thought experiments.

First of all, try to forget that you have ever heard of the concept of
intelligence as a single property of the human mind, or of that instru-
ment called the intelligence test, which purports to measure intelligence
once and for all. Second of all, cast your mind widely about the world
and think of all the roles or "end states"--vocational and avocational--
that have been prized by cultures during various eras. Consider, for
example, hunters, fishermen, farmers, shamans, religious leaders, psy-
chiatrists, military leaders, civil leaders, athletes, artists, musicians, po-
ets, parents, and scientists. Honing in closer, then, consider the three
end states with which I begin Frames of Mind: the Puluwat sailor, the
Koranic student, and the Parisian composer at her microcomputer.

In my view, if we are to encompass adequately the realm of human
cognition, it is necessary to include a far wider and more universal set of
competences than we have ordinarily considered. And it is necessary to
remain open to the possibility that many--if not most--of these com-
petences do not lend themselves to measurement by standard verbal
methods, which rely heavily on a blend of logical and linguistic abilities.

With such considerations in mind, I have formulated a definition of
what I call an "intelligence." An intelligence is the ability to solve prob-
lems, or to create products, that are valued within one or more cultural
setting--a definition that says nothing about either the sources of these
abilities or the proper means of "testing" them.

Building upon this definition, and drawing especially on biological
and anthropological evidence, I then introduce eight distinct criteria for
an intelligence. As set forth in chapter 4, these criteria range from the
isolation of a capacity as a result of brain damage to the susceptibility
of a capacity to encoding in a symbolic system. Then, in part II of the

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