| | 2 Hans Kelsen's Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism * STANLEY L. PAULSON INTRODUCTION Legal positivism in the juridico-scientific tradition of the European Continent is characterized by what might be called the facticity thesis: The constructions of the law are ultimately 'reducible to', or explicable in terms of, a concatenation of fact--for example, the will of the sovereign. 1 Shifting the idiom to a semantic counterpart of the facticity thesis, the legal theorist of a reductive persuasion 'provide[s] eliminative defini- tions of normative terms', 2 introducing instead non-normative, descrip- tive terms, in what Joseph Raz has called the reductive semantic thesis. 3 Kelsen's conviction that the facticity thesis is wrongheaded drives his theory, particularly in the very early work. In place of the legal positivist's ____________________ | * | Editors' note: This paper first appeared in the Modern Law Review, 59 ( 1996), 797-812; the present version contains minor changes. The author would like to thank Okko Behrends, Malte Dießelhorst, Ralf Dreier, and Cosima Möller (Göttingen), Bonnie Litschewski Paulson ( St. Louis), and Stefan Hammer and Alexander Somek ( Vienna) for very helpful criticism. Much earlier, the author turned to the nineteenth-century back- ground of Kelsen's theory for a presentation at the first Siena Kelsen Symposium; he remains grateful to Letizia Gianformaggio ( Ferrara) for the Symposium and, indeed, for four more that followed. | | 1 | By legal positivism, thus characterized, I have in mind an ideal type, not a particular historical view. And it is this ideal type that Kelsen uses as a part of his strategy in forging a 'middle way' between legal positivism and natural law theory; see Stanley L. Paulson, "The Neo-Kantian Dimension in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law", Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 12 ( 1992), 311-32, at 313-22. On the 'middle way' generally, see Joseph Raz, "The Purity of the Pure Theory", in this volume, ch. 12; Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, "Normative Positivism: The Mirage of the Middle-Way", Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 9 ( 1989), 463-512. | | 2 | Raz "Purity" (n. 1 above), § I. | | 3 | Ibid. § II. I do not mean to suggest that the differences between the facticity thesis and the reductive semantic thesis amount to a mere shift in idiom. For example, H.L.A. Hart's theory reflects the facticity thesis but not the reductive semantic thesis; see generally Stanley L. Paulson, "Continental Normativism and its British Counterpart: How Different are they?", Ratio Juris, 6 ( 1993), 227-44, at 236-41. Both theses apply, however, to the many theorists relegated by Kelsen to the legal positivist camp. | -23- | |