Chapter eight details how the "public-issue" standard was jet-
tisoned and replaced with a secondary constitutional privilege al-
lowing discussion with defamatory falsehoods about private
individuals, provided those falsehoods were not published negli-
gently. Finally, chapter nine examines decisions of the Burger Court
that have narrowly interpreted the judicially determined constitu-
tional privileges, giving plaintiffs the benefit of doubt in their efforts
to obtain damages for libelous falsehoods.

Despite the fluctuation in the Court's philosophy from time to
time--including the subtle shift by today's Court--the decisions
show a continuous march for freedom of speech and press. They do
not, by any means, show the extremely broad picture relating to
free speech and press. But they do show a meaningful picture in an
important area. It is this picture, concerning libel alone, that is
presented to the reader.

In writing this book, I have drawn on understandings gained
from classrooms and colleagues and from some twenty-five years
experience as a journalism practitioner and educator. Hopefully
these understandings and experiences have provided adequate
background for proper interpretations of the law. I do not, how-
ever, expect an error-free presentation and am quick to admit that
the errors are mine alone. Nevertheless I was not alone in this
project and would like to gratefully acknowledge the support given
by Dr. Leonard A. Granato and Mrs. Nell Rorie of the University of
Arkansas at Little Rock. Additionally I am particularly thankful for
the expert assistance of my wife, Claudetta, and the most excellent
work of Teresa White, who as an editor of the Southern Illinois
University Press has been my "backstop" for two books. Above all,
though, I wish to single out Dr. Howard R. Long, my mentor since
graduate studies at Southern Illinois University. His suggestions,
advice, and guidance have been invaluable. To him, I dedicate this
book.

Little Rock, Arkansas CLIFTON O. LAWHORNE

July 1980

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