I HAVE ALREADY STATED my belief that the policy of demo-
cratic world order would prove successful. From the point of view
of the United States, success for this policy, or for any policy, would,
in the first place, mean the assurance of survival. Negatively, suc-
cess would mean the defeat of the communist plan for world con-
quest and the reduction of communist power to insignificance. But,
given the existing world political situation, success must mean much
more. It must include a method for controlling atomic weapons,
which, we have seen, can only be through an absolute monopoly in
their production and possession. It must provide for the organiza-
tion of a world political system which would be workable and
through which a general, total war could be prevented. These two
requirements, which are of no more special concern to the United
States than to the world at large, can also be fulfilled by this policy.
In addition, though here we look beyond the present historical
period to which alone this policy is directly relevant, the achieve-
ment of its specific aims could be used as a bridge toward the goal
of a genuine world government.

All this is not merely logically possible. With the available means,
it could actually be done. With a determined leadership in, and by,
the United States, it would be done. I do not wish to suggest that
it could be done easily, or with small cost. The most optimistic ac-
count of the present state of the world will be very black. The most
hopeful route out of the crisis will be hard and painful and, most
probably, bloody.

The determined leadership may arise, in response to the world
challenge. What if it does not, what then will be the outcome?

If it does not, the United States will follow what I have described
as a policy of vacillation. This policy will in no way check the inten-
sification of the crisis, or the progress of the world struggle. The
struggle will go, and the flood of war will break at a moment for

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