Aquinas' theoretical analysis of the common good offers a series of metaphysical
models with which to explain the relationship between the individual and the com-
mon good--the analogical participation of individual goods in universal goodness
and in God, the communication of goodness to other individuals as a necessary aspect
of being good (bonum est diffusivum sui), and the benefit which is done to others as the
effect of an individual's receipt of grace. It was within these terms of reference, there-
fore, that Aquinas interpreted the comparative terminology from book I of Aristotle
Ethics. The common good is 'greater', 'better', and 'more divine' than the individual
good because it represents a closer approximation to the likeness of God. Aquinas
appears rather more reluctant to use the term 'more perfect', at least in the context of
the political community. Otherwise, his metaphysical account of goodness in the uni-
verse left him firmly committed to the general principle that the common good is
superior to the individual good. Aquinas' commitment to the principle of superior-
ity, however, was also accompanied by an endorsement of the principle of identity
both in his account of the predication of goodness in individual things and in his
analysis of the natural inclination of all individuals to will the good. Thus, the indi-
vidual good shares an analogical identity with the universal good, whilst the individ-
ual wills what is good for himself in willing what is good in general. At a human level,
this principle of identity also underpins Aquinas' account of the goal of happiness.
The common good is the same as the individual good because the individual's good of
virtue is the same as the supreme good of human happiness. This too was a principle
which could readily be tied to book I of the Ethics, where Aristotle's insistence that
good for the community is greater and more perfect than good for the individual had
been prefaced by the phrase 'even if the good is the same' (si enim et idem).

Aquinas' theoretical analysis of the common good, however, is not limited to the
terms which he found in book I of the Ethics. Aristotle's principle that it is better and
more divine to secure the good for a people and for city-states, for example, had been
preceded by the observation that it is worthy (kalon) to secure it for one person.
Aquinas accordingly picks up on this last term (translated by Grosseteste as amabile)
and uses it to put forward the more general argument that the individual should show
greater love for the common good. ¹ For Aquinas, the relationship between the

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